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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the implications for sexual asymmetry of the human predilection for construing events on the basis of hierarchically organized 
dichotomous constructs (eg., same/different; male/female; good/bad). Illustrations of the influence of binary cognitive structuring on the practice of 
social science, including feminist scholarship, are presented. The inescapable susceptibility of theory and empiricism to prevailing cultural ideologies 
suggests that the question of sexual equality is antinomal—not open to empirical resolution. Rather, science might better serve the species by actively 
promologating civilian values, values that cherish and revere within species diversity. 
RESUME 
Cet essai etudie les implications de l'asymetrie sexuelle de la preference humaine pour analyser les evenements bases sur des elements de dichotomie 
planifies de facon hierarchique (ex.: similaire/different; homme/femme; bon/mauvais). Des illustrations sur l'influence de la structuration de 
connaissance binaire de la pratique de la science sociale, incluant les bourses d etudes feministes, sont presentees. La susceptibilite inechapable de la 
theorie, et l'empirisme de prevaloir les ideologies culturelles suggere que la question de l'egalite sexuelle est sans nom-fermee a toute resolution 
empirique. Plutot, la science devrait mieuxservir lesespecesen faisant valoir activement les valuers civiles, valuers qui sont nourries et venerees a travers 
la diversite des especes. 
In Ursula Le Guin's (1969) science fiction novel, The 
Left Hand of Darkness, we encounter a race of beings, the 
Gethenians, who are ambisexual. Every species member 
has the potential to perform either male or female func-
tions in reproduction. When in "kemmer" (in heat) one 
partner of the sexually interacting pair assumes the female 
condition, the other the male. Any individual may mother 
or father offspring in different copulations. Sex-role ste-
reotypes, rape, oedipal complexes, a sexual division of 
labour and the like are unknown in this society. 
What impressions does a Gethenian tourist form of 
Homo sapiens once over its initial distaste at the perver-
sion of two sexes? Validating George Kelly's (1963) per-
sonal constructs theory, our Gethenian visitor is flabber-
gasted by the human predilection for dichotomous think-
ing. It seems to the Gethenian to be sine qua non of 
human existence. Kelly hypothesized that the thought 
processes, or in modern parlance, the cognitive schemas, 
involved in humans' interpretation of events are based on 
dichotomous constructs organized or structured in ordinal 
(hierarchial) relationships. 
Deeply puzzled by this terran peculiarity, the Gethenian 
probes further and perceives that a "same/different" 
dichotomy occupies a supraordinate position in the hier-
archial structure. As Tversky (1977) has noted: 
the similarity [/'difference dichotomy] plays a fund-
amental role in theories of knowledge and behav-
iour. It serves as an organizing principle by which 
individuals classify objects, form concepts and make 
generalizations (p. 327). 
Especially shocking to our Gethenian traveller is the reali-
zation that a sex dichotomy constitutes the second rung of 
the hierarchical ladder. The pervasiveness and ubiqui-
tousness of the sex dichotomy as another major organizing 
principle in human societies (Bern, 1981) could hardly 
escape notice.2 Equally fascinating is the human penchant 
for typically clustering certain other dichotomies under 
the sex rubric; for example, many of Norman Mailer's 
male fictional characters, and presumably Mailer himself, 
subsume male, good, superior, dominant and aggressive 
below the supraordinate "same" category while nestled 
under the umbrella of the different category are found the 
opposite poles of these dichotomies, female, bad, inferior, 
subordinate, passive (Milieu, 1970). Studies of sex stereo-
types reveal great commonality in the way individuals 
combine concepts related to the sex dichotomy (Brover-
man, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson 8c Rosenkrantz, 1972). 
Explanatory Systems 
Confused by such oddities, the Gethenian seeks enlight-
enment from the social science literature. Why is the sex 
dichotomy preserved in (or generalized to) so many seem-
ingly unrelated facets of human existence and why is the 
position of one sex so consistently subordinate? It finds 
biologically based explanations—focusing on hormonal 
distinctions (Broverman, Klaiber, Kobayshi & Vogel, 
1968); or extrapolated from speculation about the course 
of human evolution (Tiger, 1969); or anatomical/structu-
ral differences such as (a) the presence or absence of a penis 
(Freud, 1974) or (b) the genetically determined size of sex 
cells (Dawkins, 1976) or (c) the inner space feature (Erik-
son, 1974) or (d) functional differences in brain laterality 
(McGlone, 1980) or derived from religious accounts of the 
creation of the species, the deity constructed Homosapiens 
such that males have a divine right to dominate (McLaugh-
lin, 1979). 
The Gethenian also uncovers environmental explana-
tions, another instance of the dichotomizing bias. Aggre-
gated under the environmental pole are economic models 
such as the invention of private property and a capitalist 
mode of production (Deckard, 1979; Smith, 1983); histori-
cal explanations such as the emergence of a patriarchal 
social structure (Eisenstein, 1981); demographic orienta-
tions emphasizing sex ratios (Guttentag 8c Secord, 1983); 
educational interpretations, known in the vernacular as 
social learning theory, which argue that male hegemony 
and female subordination are instilled through socializa-
tion in each new generation (Mischel, 1966) and, finally, it 
discovers object relations theory which focuses on early 
infant experiences of separation from the mother (Cho-
dorow, 1978; May, 1980). Musing briefly over this last 
model, the Gethenian ponders the relevance of the self/ 
other split, the me/not me distinction, to the human 
enthusiasm for dichotomizing. 
The Empiricism 
Nonplussed with the simplicity and insularity of these 
one-cylinder models as well as their variety and disparate-
ness, the Gethenian adopts a logical positivist approach 
and decides to let the facts speak for themselves (Howard, 
1985). A careful scrutiny of the empirical literature should 
allow selection among these competing theories. The 
Gethenian has no trouble finding empirical support for 
its initial observation of the clustering of dichotomies; of 
the asymmetry of the sexes. Any women's studies text 
provides abundant examples of the association between 
the female category and the subordinate and/or inferior 
and/or bad categories (Greenglass, 1982; Mackay, 1983). 
But can this literature resolve the competing theories 
issue? As Howard (1985) remarks, the empirical facts can 
support a multitude of incompatible theoretical positions 
and, the Gethenian adds, vice versa. 
This point is brought home most forcibly when the 
Gethenian encounters a biologist and an environmental-
ist both describing the same bit of empiricism—specifically 
the findings of Money and Ehrhardt (1972). These authors 
studied 25 genetic females who were exposed prenatally to 
heavy doses of androgen which resulted in a hermaphro-
ditic condition, the adrenogenital syndrome. Corrective 
surgery was performed and the infants were raised as 
females. Money and Ehrhardt compared this clinical 
group with a matched control group. 
Wilson (1978) describes this research as follows: 
Did the girls show behavioral changes connected 
with their hormonal and anatomical masculiniza-
tion? As John Money and Anke Ehrhardt disco-
vered, the changes were both quite marked and 
correlated with the physical changes. Compared 
with unaffected girls of otherwise similar social 
backgrounds, the hormonally altered girls were 
more commonly regarded as tomboys while they 
were growing up. They had a greater interest in 
athletic skills, were readier to play with boys, pre-
ferred slacks to dresses and toy guns to dolls. The 
group with the adrenogenital syndrome was more 
likely to show dissatisfaction with being assigned to 
a female role... 
So at birth the twig is already bent a little bit— 
what are we to make of that? It suggests that the 
universal existence of sexual division of labour is 
not entirely an accident of cultural evolution (1978, 
p. 132). 
Mackie (1983) in summarizing the same research reports: 
The researchers found that the fetally androgenized 
females were more interested in masculine clothing, 
games and toys. Although they regarded themselves 
as female, they were considered by their mothers and 
themselves to be tomboys. In comparison with the 
control group, these subjects were less interested in 
baby-sitting and future marriage as opposed to 
careers. Interestingly, no greater incidence of physi-
cal aggression was reported. Money and Ehrhardt 
concluded that the male sex hormone had had a 
masculinizing effect. However,...their behaviour is 
within the normal range for females in our society 
and further,...female gender identity is not seriously 
disrupted by the presence of prenatal androgens 
(1983, p. 78-9). 
In the first account of this research the meagre empirical 
bits with their fuzzy surround are linked into an interpre-
tive pattern supporting a genetic biological determinist 
position. Mackie weaves the same empirical bits into a 
cultural determinist tapestry. The point is that most 
subsets of empirical checkpoints, given their scarcity and 
ambiguity can be successfully soldered to support even 
diametrically opposed theoretical frameworks. Thus, the 
Gethenian finds itself in full agreement with Stark-
Adamec and Kimball (1984), reliance on secondary sources 
is risky business indeed.5 
The Gethenian discovers that the problem extends 
beyond simply the amenability of empirical bits to myriad 
interpretation. Empirical data themselves are painted (or 
tainted) with hues from the theoretical spectrum. That is, 
prevailing ideologies actually function to produce sup-
porting empiricism (Eagly & Carli, 1981; Pyke, 1982; 
Shields, 1975). 
Garbage Disposal Mechanisms 
Given the difficulties of assessing these competing theo-
retical models on the basis of the "facts," the supporting 
empiricism, the Gethenian examines the differential abil-
ity of the theories to handle conceptual and empirical 
garbage. How do they deal with disconfirming instances— 
the false positives (the superior, dominant female) and the 
false negatives (the inferior, subordinate male)? In Homo-
sapiens culture, the Gethenian discovers, the vast array of 
disconfirming instances present no great difficulty. They 
are ignored for the most part or dismissed by application 
of the simple adage, "the exception that proves the rule" 
(the inherent illogic of the statement notwithstanding). As 
an illustration of this excellent garbage disposal mecha-
nism, consider the following distorted syllogism: 
All women are inferior and subordinate. 
Some women are not inferior and subordiate. 
Such women are exceptions that prove the rule. 
Therefore all women are inferior and subordinate. 
As example after example of the shaping influence of 
ideology on empiricism falls under its purview (e.g., 
Agnew & Pyke, 1987; Pyke, 1982), the Gethenian decides 
that the mysteries of Homo sapiens society and its organi-
zation around the sex dichotomy resist unravelling with 
either conceptual or empirical needles. The Gethenian 
concludes as do Smith (1983), Howard (1985), Lott (1985), 
Kuhn (1970), Fee (1981), and Bleier (1984), that human 
science is a far cry from its advertised claims of impartiality 
and objectivity—a value-free enterprise it is not. 
Science and Dichotomies 
More importantly perhaps, the Gethenian discovers 
that the very fabric of human social science is textured by 
the reductionism inherent in the human cognitive bias for 
binary thought. To illustrate the operation of the bias, 
consider the following. 
In all measurement theory, a fundamental distinction is 
the same/different dichotomy. All forms of measurement 
assume that the conditions for the nominal rule are met 
(i.e., that the data permit the application of same/different 
labels). Specific statistical tests such as the t-test, chi-
square and correlation are all designed to provide an index 
of same/different. Preferred research designs involve test-
ing extreme groups and ignore the majority who fall in 
between the extremes. Excluding the middle is another 
excellent strategy for avoiding empirical garbage. Between 
or within subject variance which cannot be accounted for 
by manipulation of the independent variable is termed 
"error variance." It is error or garbage because it can not be 
neatly processed in the dualistic mode. The law of parsim-
ony and the single-principle imperialism referred to by 
Koch (1981), derive appeal from their isomorphism with 
simplistic dichotomous thought. Indeed many of the cog-
nitive pathologies described by Koch (1981) so evident in 
the conduct of psychological science, may owe their popu-
larity to the human preference for dichotomizing. At a 
metaparadigmatic level, the nomothetic orientation in 
science is more clearly congruent with dichotomous cog-
nitive structuring than the non-linear, multidirectional, 
dialectic tradition of the idiographic approach (Marceil, 
1977). 
Feminist scholarship 
Feminist scholars, of course, have not been unaware of 
the consequences of binary cognitive processing. Lott 
(1985) draws attention to the inappropriate translation of 
small average sex differences into dichotomies. Constan-
tinople (1973) attacked the bipolarity assumption of the 
masculinity/femininity constructs. After a short role as 
prima donna on the feminist stage, androgyny has suc-
cumbed to assaults from those recognizing her reification 
of the very dichotomy she was designed to transcend (Bern, 
1981; Pyke & Graham, 1983). The nomothetic character of 
the bulk of sex difference research in which context and 
situation variables are ignored has been well documented 
(Lott, 1985); and Sandra Bern (1981) specifically addresses 
the issue of the human cognitive bias for dichotomizing in 
her gender schema theory. 
Yet, a feminist vaccination does not fully inoculate 
against dichotomizing. Smith (1983) accuses feminist 
scholars of falling prey to the same reductionism so 
obvious in sociobiology. Exhortations to employ new 
sources of information in research and to apply new 
methodologies, however laudable, continue to be couched 
in dichotomous forms (i.e., agentic methods versus com-
munal methods). Even the research corpus itself dissects 
neatly into a same/different rubric (Lott, 1985). One sec-
tion of feminist scholarship focuses on the "same" end of 
the dichotomy, striving to illustrate that females are not 
different from males (e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) while 
the contrasting section emphasizes the differences between 
the sexes (e.g., Gilligan, 1982). Both schools tend to ignore 
within group variance. 
Bored by the antediluvian binary conceptualizations of 
Homosapiens and appalled by the "dystopian nightmare'' 
of the human condition (Schweichart, 1983), with it's 
double evils of nuclear holocaust and/or planetary pollu-
tion, the Gethenian tourist decides to spend the rest of its 
holiday exploring the Great Nebula in Andromeda. As the 
Gethenian readies its ship for departure, it muses on the 
sex issue. The asymmetry of the sexes, it decides, is not a 
scientific issue. The question of women's appropriate sta-
tus, or role is antinomal, not open to empirical resolution. 
Rather, the subordinate status of females is a function of 
the barbaric human value system combined with the 
limited capabilities of human thought, the tendency to 
edit or oversimplify through dichotomizing. 
The primary issue revolves around the nature of the 
culture that Homosapiens want to establish. Given their 
garbage—pollution, the bomb, the daily atrocities of dis-
crimination, prejudice, intolerance, rape, muggings, child 
and wife abuse, murder, extortion, terrorism, grinding 
poverty, ignorance, over-population and urban crowding, 
humans clearly do not have a civilization of which they 
can be justly proud. Indeed, they may not even have a 
viable civilization. Still, given their value structure and 
disaffection for the complexity of non-dichotomous 
thought, humans probably have the science and the 
society they deserve. 
A Mandate 
However, the Gethenian finds solace in the observation 
that a capacity for non-dichotomous thought exists, that 
humans can conceptualize Utopian visions—other ways of 
thinking, feeling and behaving (Schweickart, 1983). The 
Gethenian encounters unexpectedly rich and sophisti-
cated representations of reality as it explores individual 
passions and enthusiasms. Reserved for the treasured 
aspects of one's life experience (e.g., philately; chess) are 
complex, non-dichotomous schemata. Reassuring, too, is 
the emerging and strengthening awareness of the debili-
tating correlates of simplistic cognitive representations 
(Beck, 1976; Linville, 1985). Another note of optimism 
resonates from the budding legitimization and implemen-
tation of a feminist philosophy of science generating 
research that is futuristic; that triangulates rather than 
bifurcates; that eschews dualisms; that examines interac-
tions as opposed to fixating on main effects; that is ethical, 
adhering to the principle that the end doesn't justify the 
means; that investigates phenomena in context, not in 
isolation; that recognizes the role of ideology and bias; that 
respects the validity of personal experience; that is precise 
in its language and generalizations; that is concerned with 
understanding and appreciation rather than mastery and 
control; that is not wedded to a simple cause and effect 
paradigm; that refuses to artificially compartmentalize or 
hierarchically structure phenomena; that adopts a long-
term perspective; that is process oriented (Bleier, 1984; 
Deaux, 1984; Lott, 1985; Wallston, 1981). 
Most promising from the Gethenian's perspective, are 
the hints that Homosapiens may be gradually realizing 
that there are merits in the deliberate incorporation of 
values into scientific pursuits (Howard, 1985; McCor-
mack, 1981). The overt politicization of science is essential 
if an egalitarian society is to be achieved, or indeed if the 
species is to survive at all given its teetering position on the 
brink of planetary destruction. The goals of science must 
be used to advance values, to inculcate values, to promul-
gate values, but not values based on the primitive dualisms 
so abhorrent to the Gethenian but rather civilian values— 
values that cherish the infinite uniqueness of humanity; 
that respect within species diversity.4 As Howard (1985) so 
cogently put it: 
By viewing humans from an unduly narrow pers-
pective we may diminish rather than expand hu-
mans' potential as individuals and as a species. Our 
challenge, then, is to construct a science of humans 
built upon an image of humanity that reflects and 
reveres human nature in all of its diversity, complex-
ity and subtlety (p. 264). 
In a similar vein, the Psychology of Women Division of 
the American Psychological Association records that 
among the characteristics of feminist scholarship is the 
promotion of a benevolent society in which individual 
self-actualization is possible (Lott, 1985). This, then, is the 
mandate: women may be best equipped to implement it 
(Bakan, 1966; Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982) and must 
succeed because the consequences of failure may be no less 
than the total annihilation of the species. 
The last transmission received from the Gethenian 
space vessel demonstrated that some acculturation had 
occurred. As its ship winked out, the Gethenian was heard 
to mutter, "Dichotomies suck!" 
NOTES 
1. Portions of this paper formed part of an invited address at the 
Institute for Women and Psychology, Canadian Psychological 
Association Annual Meeting, Halifax, 1985. The author would like 
to acknowledge the contributions of Professors Neil Agnew and 
David Bakan to the development of some of the ideas presented. 
2. Pyke and Graham (1983, p.4) suggest that, "perhaps Homosapiens 
has evolved an innate capacity for abstracting and categorizing 
(reminiscent of Chomsky's [1959] language-acquisition-device)." 
To explain why the sex distinction has assumed such a pivotal 
position they note that,"it could be argued that a sensitivity to 
stimuli related to reproduction would have survival value for the 
species and thus be favoured in the process of species evolution" (p. 
4). 
3. Money himself adopts the environmentalist position that psyche 
dominates soma. "The evidence of hermaphroditism, then, shows 
that it is possible for psychosexual differentiation to be contradic-
tory of chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, hormonal sex, external geni-
tal sex, and internal genital sex, and to agree instead with assigned 
sex" (Money, 1963, p. 56). 
4. Even a desultory discussion of the "specific" values science ought to 
advance lies beyond the scope of this paper as doesa consideration of 
the underlying decision process involved in any valuc(s) selection. 
However, it seems clear that the ethos of self-contained individual-
ism which permeates much of psychological science (Sampson, 
1977) must be tempered with a more collective, interdependent 
perspective (reflecting the communal modality described by Bakan) 
if civilian values are to be successfully pursued. 
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MARY OF THE ROSES 
Oh, I know we see her small, 
almost a child, one more forgiving 
victim, but suppose it was not like that 
at all. Suppose she was a tall woman, 
let's say six foot two, and built 
like a Michelangelo statue, hands thick 
as potatoes, with veins like great rivers. 
Suppose she had seen what the little boys wagged 
behind the bushes, and could roar like a lion 
at a good joke, her laughing hair shaking all the way to 
her knees. 
Suppose her back was tough as bark, 
sunbranded dark as the blood rose. 
Not like the painted white ladies in museums 
with skins soft as wet napkins. 
As she balanced a full jug on her head 
She sang with a knowing kind of woman sadness 
and danced with big wide feet and big wide hips 
and big loose joints so the water swirled 
round and round in the clay, now and then 
catching the air with its wings. 
And one day 
her eyes rebellious and black as ripe grapes 
while hauling water from the stream 
she lifted her skirts to fan herself a bit, 
and seeing she was alone slipped off her clothes 
and stepped into the current, letting her laughter 
roll out of her mouth like thunder, 
letting the river roll over her back 
wetting the springy tendrils of black hair 
at the sweaty nape of her neck. 
And suppose the angel was sent 
thirsty and fainting over all the earth, 
searching for someone who could love 
without anything miraculous about it, 
woman of the ordinary shoes, 
and there by the stream he found her 
startled, laughing, naked 
rising unashamed from the water, 
her breasts like suds slipping wet 
over her folded arms, and he cried out 
with love for her, 
and the sound of his cry 
filled the desert 
with roses. 
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